Medals not required – why some greats simply don’t need them

HARRY KANE has broken Tottenham Hotspur’s scoring record, no mean feat when you have Jimmy Greaves and Martin Chivers in the same list. Kane deserves credit for this remarkable achievement, but no sooner had he netted his latest goal, people were talking about his lack of medals. Spurs haven’t won anything in Kane’s time, indeed you have to go back to 2008 for their last trophy. Players often claim their desire to leave a club is based on the desire to “win things” and as Kane heads towards 30, you can understand any anxiety about ending his peak years without some sort of bauble to place in his cabinet at Chez Kane.

But not all great players have boxloads of medals when they want to recall their football career. In fact, some of the game’s outstanding names have very little silverware to show for a glittering career. Much depends on who they play for – if you are Lionel Messi or Cristiano Ronaldo, the statistics of their careers match the plaudits they have received, because they have played for great, successful clubs. Messi has won 11 league titles and Ronaldo seven, but CR7 has won five Champions League medals to Messi’s four. Messi, of course, now has a World Cup momento on display at home.

Zlatan Ibrahomovic has 12 league titles to his name, from the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and France. Bayern’s Thomas Müller has 11 Bundesliga medals, while Paco Gento of Real won 12 La Ligas with Real Madrid. Johan Cruyff won 10 league titles, along with seven domestic cups and three European Cups. He was a league champion with three different clubs: Ajax, Barcelona and Feyenoord. Kenny Dalglish won 23 major medals in his playing career, including 10 league titles with Celtic and Liverpool. Play for the top clubs and you win medals – just ask Phil Neal, Liverpool’s full back, who won seven league titles, four European Cups, four league cups and the UEFA Cup, along with 50 England caps.

Some players, unfortunately, play the role of big fish at a club less equipped to winning major honours on a regular basis. Tom Finney and Stanley Matthews, two of the wizards of the wing, won praise week-by-week and were mainstays of the England team. Finney was a Preston North End player from 1946 to 1960, he won 76 caps for England but never won a major honour. Matthews won 54 caps during a career that saw him play for Stoke City and Blackpool. His only honour was the FA Cup in 1953. Both these players earned their place in football history because they were truly great at what they did.

Similarly, there were members of the England 1966 winning team that didn’t enjoy incredible success as club players. Gordon Banks, for example, had to wait until the back end of his career for his one and only medal with Stoke City, the Football League Cup in 1972. George Cohen, a fine full back with Fulham, never won a major prize with his club. Ray Wilson won the FA Cup in 1966 with Everton, but injuries prevented him winning more. The Charlton brothers were the most successful, but Bobby’s trophy winning days ended two years after 1966 as Manchester United entered a period of decline. Big Jack was part of Don Revie’s ultra-professional unit that went close to winning everything, but invariably failed at so many final hurdles. Jimmy Greaves, who missed the World Cup final and then drifted away from the England scene, actually only won three medals in English football, the last in 1967.

George Best, for all his brilliance and headlines, won his last medal in 1968. His career was strangely anti-climatic – he won three medals and 37 caps for Northern Ireland. The man who became the face of British football when Best’s star waned, Kevin Keegan, fared much better in his tangible assets haul – three league titles with Liverpool, one with Hamburg, one European Cup, two UEFA Cups and 63 caps for England. It is fair to say Keegan made the most of his career.

Not so players like Best and even Diego Maradona, who won six medals at club level, although lifting the World Cup eclipses most other pieces of objet d’art. Pelé, because he was limited to appearing for Santos for most of his career, also had few items to show for his wonderful skills.

But did this really matter in times gone by? Arguably not. Today, the football world expects the top names to continually grace the big occasions, but given we are talking about a team game, an individual can only do so much. Hence, Ronaldo has never won the World Cup, even though his fans continually will them to be crowned champion. While the likes of Matthews and Finney were clubmen of the highest order, they were never likely to win the League Championship with their long-time employers. Bobby Moore, another legendary figure, stayed with West Ham for most of his career, a club that was respected and won the occasional cup, but were never contenders for the title. In the modern game, great players gravitate towards the clubs with money and trophy-winning potential. They might start with a West Ham or a Fulham, but they will surely end up with a Chelsea, a Manchester City or Liverpool.

A good way to measure this is to consider the England World Cup squads. In 1966, Alf Ramsey’s 22 players came from 14 different clubs of which nine were playing for the top six of 1965-66. Four years on, the needle had shifted and only 10 clubs were called upon and 11 were from the top six. In more recent times, the World Cup squad of 2018 was drawn from 10 clubs, but 18 of the 23 were from the so-called “big six”.

Other nations have different squad compositions. France, the 2018 World champions, had a squad that was drawn from across Europe, 15 clubs from five different countries. Croatia, the runners-up were even more diverse, 23 players from 21 clubs in no less than 10 countries. This shows that while overseas players tend to ply their trade across the European landscape, English players are more likely to stay at home and the most successful ones move in the direction of the richest and most successful. It is likely, then, that the top players can collect far more medals than their predecessors from past decades.

It would be inappropriate to talk of medals and not recognise some of the most celebrated players. Liverpool’s Phil Neal, for example, won eight league titles and four European Cups while Celtic’s Billy McNeill was Scottish champion nine times and won 23 medals. Ryan Giggs, in a career that spanned 24 seasons, won no less than 13 league titles. And yet, Alan Shearer won a solitary league title with Blackburn and Gary Lineker waited until he was 30 for his only prize in English football with Tottenham, although two years earlier, he did win the European Cup-Winners’ Cup with Barcelona.

Although some players may feel that a career without official recognition may leave an empty feeling when they retire, consolation can be found in the way they are remembered by the people paying to watch them. While medals can be sold to boost the pension pot, the memories of the fans will never fade. It is not always necessary to wear garlands to be identified as a football legend. Harry Kane is certainly a Tottenham legend in his own lifetime.

The monumental task of unlocking Brazilian football’s potential

BACK IN the 1970s, the financial industry identified Latin America as a land of opportunity, but only tentatively dipped their big toes into the water. The region was rich in raw materials and had rising populations that could propel growth in Argentina, Brazil and beyond. Most banks were cautious and entered into partnerships with other institutions to form consortiums. When the oil shock arrived and debt defaults became a reality due to hyperinflation, economic stagnation and crippling foreign debt, these consortium banks floundered and appetite for the region subsided.[1]

In 1988, with restructuring underway, Brazilian debt was used by Dutch electronics firm Philips, owners of PSV Eindhoven at the time, to buy Romario, then 24 years old and not quite the superstar he became. Philips paid US$ 4 million for Brazilian debt with a 25% discount. They then cashed the debt for Brazilian Cruzados and paid Vasco da Gama for young Romario.[2]  This novel method highlighted that footballers had become a form of currency and were, effectively, the new raw materials.

Exports

Brazil is the biggest exporter of football talent in the world; in 2022, there were over 1,200 Brazilian footballing expatriates, with around 20% of them playing in Portugal, the most common migratory route for young talent. [3] The latest World Cup squad included only three of 26 players who were attached to Brazilian clubs. When Brazil won the World Cup in 1970, all 22 squad members were employed domestically. Of the 2022 players, 12 were playing for English clubs, five for Spanish sides and three plying their trade in Italy.

Brazil’s big 12 clubs [4], over the past decade, received more than € 2 billion in transfer fees, with Flamengo (€ 267m), São Paulo (€ 257m) and Palmeiras (€ 206m) the biggest earners. Selling to Europe is an important part of their business model and European clubs also cast their net wide in Brazil. Players like Vinicius Junior, Neymar, Richarlison and Gabriel Jesus were all signed from Brazilian clubs for sizeable fees.

The population of Brazil, now well over 210 million, is football mad, it has a number of iconic clubs but they lag behind Europe and are also in danger of trailing Major League Soccer. South America has always been looked upon as the world’s second football market, but its position could come under threat from better organised and financially smarter leagues. In order for Brazilian football to change, the clubs have to attract greater investment and more lucrative sponsorship and they have to increase the value of their playing resources.

The underlying feeling is that Brazil could/should be competing with Europe, that the raw materials should be benefitting domestic football far more and for longer. This could transform Brazil from Europe’s nursery to Europe’s peer, but before that can happen, the entire economic environment of the Brazilian game has to alter. Generally, in the digital age, South America should be gaining more of the global football market.

Laws

Brazil doesn’t just have major football clubs, it also has its share of major corporations – Vale, Electrobras and Petrobras, to name but three – and the country has the 12th biggest economy in the world. [5] Vale, for example, is the biggest producer of iron ore in the world, which is Brazil’s top export. If the business world can leverage globalisation, then surely, football (one of Brazil’s most visible exports) can do likewise.

The rebooting of Brazilian football hinges on the success of a new law that enables clubs to create corporate structures – SAs (Sociedad Anônimas de Futebol). It’s not the first time such moves have been made, there were two attempts to make clubs more corporate in the form of the Zico Law (1993) and Pelé Law (1998). [6] Neither worked too well.

This latest law will open the door for greater investment from abroad, in fact it is already underway with two iconic but financially challenged Brazilian clubs, Botafogo and Vasca da Gama, benefitting from US investors. Meanwhile, another club, Cruzeiro, also with money problems, was bought by the original Ronaldo. These three clubs had combined debts of around US$ 450 million and, according to EY, the total debt among top flight teams was US$ 1.9 billion (R$ 10.3 billion) in 2020. As well as these takeovers, two clubs were already owned by companies, Red Bull Bragantino, now part of the Red Bull multi-club model, and Cuiba, who are backed by a tyre company. 

Challenge

There is significant upside for Brazil’s leading clubs. Even considering the volatile nature of the country’s economy over the years, they are punching below their weight. In terms of status in football’s advertising markets, Brazil’s football ranks among the top five, but the commercial revenues of Brazilian clubs come in at 14th. Only Ligue 1, the Bundesliga, Premier League and MLS are more important, but commercial revenues among Brazilian clubs amount to only US$ 170 million, dominated by Palmeiras (US$ 31m), Flamengo (US$ 29m) and Corinthians (US$ 23m). Clubs in Austria, Turkey, Mexico and Portugal certainly earn more from commercial activity.

Part of the problem is that Brazilian football brands are weak globally, even though around five million Brazilians live outside of Brazil. The definitive Brazilian football brand is the national team, recognised across the globe with an image – samba football – that is actually misaligned with reality. But Brazil still remains a major attraction at every tournament, 40 years since they last had a team that lived up to spirit of jogo bonita. Recently, there has been an attempt to promote Brazil through the rivalry between its two dominant forces, Flamengo and Palmeiras. According to Sports Value, there are just three clubs with an economic valuation exceeding US$ 400 million – the aforementioned and Corinthians. From a brand perspective, Sports Value considers Flamengo’s brand is worth US$ 154 million, some US$ 30 million more than Palmeiras. The consultancy revealed that mismanagement, budget imbalances, debt accumulation and a lack of transparency all conspire to impact Brazilian club brands in a negative way. [7]

A new way

The new SA law [8] will open doors for Brazil and right now, there is a move to break-up the existing structure and provoke a “Premier League moment” that transforms domestic football and moves clubs like Flamengo, Palmeiras, Fluminense and Corinthians into the global spotlight. This is motivated by a desire to leverage TV rights and commercial opportunities as well as improving the perception of Brazilian football. The national football federation has a poor image due to past corruption and inefficiencies. More revenues would mean better wages for young players which would have the effect of keeping talent longer at home before players move to Europe, which in turn would drive the price up and reap more rewards for Brazil’s clubs.

There are currently two consortiums trying to drive change: Codajas Sports Kapital, whose Liga do Futebol Brasileiro (Libra) has support from 16 clubs; and Liga Forte Futebol, which has backing from 26. Codajas has progressed its involvement by talking to Mubadala Capital, an arm of the Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund to sell 20% of its stake in the project for US$ 890 million. Apparently, Mubadala were chosen over a number of US private equity firms.  

Codajas has very clear ambitions for the new Brazilian league – Lawrence Magrath told the media that in 10 years, he envisages Brazil being comparable to France’s Ligue 1 by revenues and in 20 years, Brazil to be the second biggest league in the world after the Premier League. At the moment, there’s a lack of consensus over TV rights, among other things, but talks with Globo, the main broadcaster, are expected to take place soon.

Brazil has two of the world’s megacities: São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, with populations of 12.4 million and 6.8 million respectively. Brazil was badly hit by the pandemic and in its aftermath, poverty across the nation was expected to hit nearly 30% in 2022. São Paulo has a rate of between 13% and 19%, depending on where you source your figures, but it is clear that the number of people below the poverty line is growing. This in itself will pose a challenge for Brazilian football. [9]

Nothing moves too quickly, so the discussions around a football revolution in Brazil will undoubtedly drag on. It’s just one aspect of the South American game that could dramatically change if the will and money is made available. CONMEBOL must surely be hoping that the Copa Libertadores will become the Champions League of the Western Hemisphere, especially after moving to a neutral venue, one-legged final.

Brazil has had to deal with a general election and political unrest, a disappointing 2022 World Cup and the sad death of football legend Pelé. The nation is still mourning the loss of their sporting icon, but they could do worse than name a new league after the man who still represents everything that is good about the beautiful game in Brazil.


[1] The Silent Revolution: The IMF 1979-1989. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2001/ch08.pdf

[2] The New York Times, Soccer Star Traded for Debt, October 1988. https://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/22/business/soccer-star-traded-for-debt.html

[3] Source: CIES Football Observatory May 2022.

[4] Brazil’s G-12 Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G-12_(Brazilian_football)

[5] Visual Capitalist October 2021 https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-top-10-biggest-companies-in-brazil/

[6] Football Corporations in Brazil: New perspectives for investing in Brazilian football teams, November 2022. Gustavo Coehlo and Matheus Lamarca. https://www.ibanet.org/football-corporations-brazil

[7] Sports Value. Brazilian Clubs’ Economic Valuation 2021, December 2022.

[8] Ankura: Brazilian football – big opportunity, big risk https://angle.ankura.com/post/102i0es/brazilian-football-big-opportunity-big-risk?utm_source=mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_term=Finance-and-Banking&utm_content=articleoriginal&utm_campaign=article

[9] World Bank in Brazil, October 2022. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview